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ABSTRACT 
 
Regional economic integration has resulted from the globalization phenomena.  Nations establish 
trade blocs as a strategic maneuver, while firms seeking growth and investment opportunities 
require knowledge of prevailing business laws.  Prudent, integrated policy-making will support 
the trade bloc’s interactions and provide firms with a sense of certainty.  The business bankruptcy 
laws of South America’s largest trade bloc, MERCOSUR, are investigated to determine if they are 
moving toward alignment that would foster growth within the association and attract foreign 
investors.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he strategic assessment process is critical to all firms investigating market growth opportunities, 
especially in emerging markets (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2008).  From a 
strategic perspective, nations should implement consistent policies as a safeguard from the adverse 
impact of global pressures (Agbetsiafa, 2011; Beraho & Elisu, 2010; Fishlow, 2013).  Although a complete review 
of all risks associated with entering a market is beyond the scope of this paper, the assessment of national- and 
regional-level risks is a necessary part of the strategic management process (Rangan & Drummond, 2004).  Within 
the context of national- and regional-level risks, the legal infrastructure, and thereby market stability, should be 
assessed (Barney & Hesterly, 2006; Deresky, 2014; Rangan & Drummond, 2004).  For example, a nation’s 
bankruptcy laws are an essential consideration (Araujo & Funchal, 2005; Araujo, Ferreira, & Funchal, 2012; Holt, 
2007; LeMaster, Downey, & Brewerton, 2007; Tanzi, 2004).  This investigation is critical since the management of 
cross-border bankruptcies is garnering increasing attention (Evans & Borders, 2013; Filho, 2009; Mason, 2012).   
 
For an economy to achieve efficiencies, it must have effective institutions (Araujo et al., 2012; Tanzi, 
2004). The presence of a modern bankruptcy process is instrumental to the way a nation distributes its available 
resources (Stone, 2010) and responds to financial issues (Beraho & Elisu, 2010).  In addition, this will assist 
multinational corporations seeking opportunities to understand the current state of affairs in these nations (Alli, 
Winter, & May, 2007; Blodgett & Kane, 2003; Evans & Borders, 2013; Holt, 2007).  Furthermore, the presence of 
certainty created by legal mechanisms will attract investment (Holt, 2007; Kleinheisterkamp, 2000; Yong, 2010). 
 
As developing economies engage in the global market, their legal structures, specifically bankruptcy laws, 
must provide an ease of entry for foreign entrants and foster an environment for development (Araujo & Funchal, 
2005; Blodgett & Kane, 2003; Fishlow, 2013; Mason, 2012; Khanna et al., 2005).  Nations develop bankruptcy laws 
to remedy economic issues and can differ greatly from one another (Beraho & Elisu, 2010; Lee, Yamakawa, Peng, 
& Barney, 2011).  Each country is unique in the development timeline and structure of their legal system and is 
usually not in perfect alignment with their neighbor.  As a result of globalization, trade blocs are created around 
commerce agreements to increase trade and drive growth (Castanias & Yelamanchi, 2004; Gough & 
Venkataramany, 2006).  A key component to the bloc’s success is coordination of legislation (Haskel, 2013). 
 
Large economic blocs are more attractive for foreign investment and require additional investigation 
(Hashmi, 2012).  The trade bloc MERCOSUR represents substantial economic weight for South America.  The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the current state of the MERCOSUR members’ prevailing laws, specifically 
governing business bankruptcy proceedings (Yong, 2010).  Of interest is the enquiry into whether the nations are 
moving their polices into alignment.  This paper contributes to a greater understanding of the prevailing business 
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and investment conditions with a focus on examining developing economies (Araujo et al., 2012; Khanna et al., 
2005; Lee et al., 2011; Li et al., 2008).  As the MERCOSUR members grow, they will require an alignment of and 
adherence to regulatory policies or seek opportunities independently (Fishlow, 2013).  Furthermore, this paper 
provides a framework to study other economic trade blocs. 
 
Remaining sections of this paper consist of an explanation of the economic integration as a result of 
globalization, an introduction of a conceptual framework as an analysis tool, a presentation of the current status of 
MERCOSUR members’ business insolvency laws, and a discussion of the implications followed by conclusions. 
 
GLOBALIZATION LEADS TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
Globalization is defined as “global competition characterized by networks of international linkages that 
bind countries, institutions, and people in an interdependent global economy” (Deresky, 2014, p. 4).  The 
globalization phenomenon requires nations to develop policy responses to shifting market demands.  A competitive 
marketplace propels nations of all sizes to create functional regional economic organizations to better meet the 
challenges present in the interconnected global economy (Cordoba, 2012). 
 
Economic integration is defined as “the lessening of trade barriers and the increased flow of goods and 
services, capital, labor, and technology” (Deresky, 2014, p. 4).  This integration is illustrated by increasing levels of 
economic interconnectedness delineated in five levels as follows: free trade area, customs union, common market, 
economic union, and political union (Cavusgil, Knight, & Riesenberger, 2012).  At one end of the spectrum, a free 
trade area does not uphold unified trade barriers with non-members; NAFTA is an example.  Continuing along the 
spectrum, the economic union maintains a goal for members to achieve relative monetary and fiscal policies - the 
European Union (EU) is an example (Cavusgil et al., 2012).  On the other end of the spectrum, political union is 
defined as a complete merging of all policies and is only discussed theoretically.   
 
The objective of integrating economies is to increase the exchange of market participants, services, and 
products by decreasing trade barriers (Alli et al., 2007; Deresky, 2014).  For example, utilizing regional-based 
relationships will assist navigating the changing economic landscape (Alli et al., 2007; Bisson, Kirkland, & 
Stephenson, 2010; Cordoba, 2012).  These trade blocs represent commerce agreements that support increased trade 
and fuel globalization (Castanias & Yelamanchi, 2004; Gough & Venkataramany, 2006).  The integration can be 
fostered by geographic proximity, which is known as regional integration (Cavusgil et al., 2012).  Furthermore, 
regional-level cooperation in developing economies, specifically Latin America, is necessary to grow domestic 
markets, export strength, and attract trade partners (Gough & Venkataramany, 2006). 
 
MERCOSUR is considered “the fourth largest trading bloc after the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN”, along 
with accounting for “75 percent of South America’s GDP” (Deresky, 2014, p. 16).  With the admission of 
Venezuela in 2012, the trading bloc “became the world’s fifth-largest economy” (Keller, 2012, p. 1).  Furthermore, 
it is the largest economic trading bloc in South America (Cavusgil et al., 2012; Lawrence, Hanouz, & Doherty, 
2012).  Considering the economic might of MERCOSUR, it has not made substantial progress aligning its policies, 
thereby hindering its progress (Canac, 2003; Fishlow, 2013; Yong, 2010). 
 
For developing nations, it should be imperative to enact strong policy during growth periods (Agbetsiafa, 
2011; Fishlow, 2013).  Nations will increase their economic interconnectedness by engaging in trade with fellow 
countries because it is a strong impetus for growth (Alli et al., 2007; Castanias & Yelamanchi, 2004; Fishlow, 2013; 
Gough & Venkataramany, 2006).  The recognition of the importance of allowing the movement of a nation’s factors 
of production across borders seamlessly is a critical step in responding to the realities of globalization (Bisson, et al., 
2010).  For example, firms will take advantage of this environment and outsource various activities as a strategic 
maneuver that requires knowledge of foreign governments and their regulatory schemes (Alli et al., 2007; Sen & 
Haq, 2010).  As a strategic measure, nations should pursue consistent policies to mitigate the negative impact 
resulting from global pressures (Agbetsiafa, 2011; Beraho & Elisu, 2010), whereas from the firm-level perspective, 
globalization will extend activities and assets across borders (Mohan, 2012).  A critical infrastructure to support the 
integration of developing economies is that legal structures governing business bankruptcy must harmonize 
(Blodgett & Kane, 2003).  The scope of a nation’s bankruptcy laws is an essential element to creating an 
environment for firm growth (Holt, 2007; Lee et al., 2011; Mason, 2012). 
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TERRITORIALISM AND UNIVERSALISM  
 
Territorialism provides that an individual country maintains jurisdiction regarding a firm’s bankruptcy 
proceedings inside its national borders (LoPucki, 1999).  Foreseeably, a foreign investor’s assets could be consumed 
by the bankruptcy procedure in that foreign country (Filho, 2009).  Conversely, Universalism allows a single court 
to administer a firm’s insolvency proceedings on a global level with assistance from the involved countries 
(Westbrook, 2002).  Theoretically, this may imply a single court to administer a universal group of bankruptcy laws; 
establishing this framework is not realistic in the near future (Rasmussen, 2007). 
 
As a means toward cooperation, Comity is a principle which stipulates that “one nation gives effect to the 
laws and judicial decisions of another nation as a matter of deference and mutual respect” (Holt, 2007, p. 106).  The 
author argues that Universalism supports this principle, while Territorialism does not require this framework.  The 
concepts of Universalism and Territorialism are utilized as a backdrop to analyze the prevailing bankruptcy laws of 
MERCOSUR members (LeMaster et al., 2007). 
 
At nation-level policy-making, thereby, government intervention is a key element to success.  Tanzi (2004) 
and Araujo et al. (2012) argued that functioning economies require efficient institutions, specifically systems to 
facilitate bankruptcy with transparency.  The reality of cross-border bankruptcy can result in great financial and time 
resource commitment (Mohan, 2012).  Conversely, given the presence of legal mechanisms that create certainty, 
foreign investment will be attracted (Holt, 2007; Kleinheisterkamp, 2000; Yong, 2010).  The agreement to adopt 
cross-border bankruptcy laws will create a more efficient and favorable environment for investors (Blodgett & 
Kane, 2003; Holt, 2007; Mason, 2012).   
 
As world-wide competition increases, cross-border economic pacts will result (Deresky, 2014).  A key 
component to the bloc’s success is coordination of legislation (Haskel, 2013), supported by governments intervening 
with prudent polices (Bisson et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2011).  In reality, members should normalize regulations among 
members to foster economic exchange (Keller, 2012). 
 
For example, there is a distinction between an insolvent and illiquid firm.  While the insolvent firm will 
proceed to liquidation, the illiquid firm may survive following a reorganization process (Olivares-Caminal & 
Frigerio, 2009).  The reorganization procedure is critical to salvage a firm, especially in developing economies 
(Araujo & Funchal, 2005).  With companies extending their activities and investments across borders, the prevailing 
reorganization procedure will be of importance (Filho, 2009).  Furthermore, the ability to negotiate out-of-court 
(e.g., private) settlements and determine the priority of claims provides investors and creditors a certain level of 
predictability (Olivares-Caminal & Frigerio, 2009).  The presence of a modern rehabilitation process allows firms to 
efficiently navigate the bankruptcy process (Stone, 2010). 
 
In order for nations to operate within a group, a supranational framework is required to assist members to 
coordinate their economic activities (Canac, 2003; Yong, 2010).  The adoption and adherence to a unifying 
bankruptcy legal framework will address the issue of jurisdiction, thereby fostering a sense of certainty critical to 
attract investment, create market efficiencies, and promote growth (Holt, 2007; Khanna et al., 2005).  This 
commitment will immensely assist the trade bloc to achieve growth within the group and moving outward as a 
unified entity. 
 
MERCOSUR MEMBERS 
 
Southern Common Market or Common Market of the South 
 
In 1988, the governments of Argentina and Brazil entered into a free trade agreement that eventually grew 
into MERCOSUR with an ultimate goal to create a common market (Hill, 2013; Keller, 2012). MERCOSUR was 
formally established in 1991 (Canac, 2003; Cavusgil et al., 2012) to embody economic and political agreements 
(Klonsky, Hanson, & Lee, 2012).  
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MERCOSUR is considered a customs union (Cordoba, 2012; Haskel, 2013; Keller, 2012) because it is 
integrated on a regional level and the members have committed to harmonizing “their external trade policies and 
adopt common tariff and nontariff barriers on imports from nonmember” nations (Cavusgil et al., 2012, p. 229).  A 
resulting goal was to create a competitive advantage by increasing efficiencies and capitalizing geographic 
proximity (“About Mercosur”, n.d.; Canac, 2003).  In Latin America, several nations have revised their bankruptcy 
codes (Olivares-Caminal & Frigerio, 2009). 
 
The full members of MERCOSUR are Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela.  The 
Associate members are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (Klonsky et al., 2012).  Associate members are 
not included in this analysis because until full integration is achieved, they are not receiving tariff benefits (Cavusgil 
et al., 2012) and lack voting rights (Keller, 2012; Klonsky et al., 2012).  In the future, MERCOSUR’s economic 
might will grow with their inclusion (de Castro Neves, 2013).  Currently, membership in other trade bloc precludes 
nations from full membership (Cordoba, 2012; Desantis, 2013; Klonsky et al., 2012).   
 
The bankruptcy laws of the full members will be assessed, along with providing a brief status of each 
member.  A summary of these items is provided in Table 1.  The prevailing bankruptcy laws are discussed as to 
whether they acknowledge foreign investment, provide for a reorganization and/or private settlement process, and 
stipulate the priority order of creditor claims. 
 
The majority of national bankruptcy laws allow for the liquidation and/or reorganization process.  Although 
a dire financial condition of some firms requires the liquidation of the assets, other firms can be saved.  In essence, 
the reorganization process allows a firm to continue operations while restructuring their debt (Araujo & Funchal, 
2005).  The goal of efficient bankruptcy procedures should ensure that creditors are protected and prioritized (Hart, 
2000). 
 
Table 1: Individual MERCOSUR Member’s Bankruptcy Law Provisions 
Country 
Foreign Investment 
Legally Acknowledged 
Reorganization 
Creditor Claim 
Ranking Provided 
Out of Court 
Settlement Available 
Argentina X X X X 
Brazil X X X X 
Paraguay X X X  
Uruguay X X X X 
Venezuela N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Argentina 
 
Argentina has recently implemented many state-controlled economic policies (Fishlow, 2013; “Latin 
American Geoeconomics”, 2013).  Specifically, the administration appears to favor strategic economic sectors with 
protectionist measures (Country Conditions: Argentina, 2013).  Also, the nation’s continuing issues with Britain 
regarding the Falkand Islands further thwart the bloc’s conversations with external markets (Cordoba, 2012; “Latin 
American Integration,” 2013).  As a result, the nation is not aligning with the overall policies of MERCOSUR 
(Haskel, 2013). 
 
Argentina welcomes foreign investment and allows for equal treatment for those assets (Alfaro, Mazer, & 
Abogados, 2013).  The Argentine Bankruptcy Law (Law 24.522) governs the bankruptcy process.  The Law allows 
the debtor firm to reorganize while continuing operations or seeking a private (e.g., out-of-court) settlement with 
debtors (Alfaro et al., 2013).  Furthermore, creditors are granted privileged status to those holding wages, taxes, and 
mortgage claims (Willa & Roca, 2013). In a turn away from the traditional insolvency process, employees of a 
cooperative supersede creditors by requesting the firm to continue as a going concern (Alfaro et al., 2013; “New 
Argentine Bankruptcy Law,” 2011). 
 
Brazil 
 
Brazil is considered the largest economy in Latin America and globally ranks fifth in population and 
seventh in size of economy (Deresky, 2014).  Due to its size, the nation tends to represent the other MERCOSUR 
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countries (Lawrence et al., 2012).  Although it is attractive to foreign investors (Roett, 2010), Brazil has lost some 
competitiveness and risks isolation from the larger, global economy.  This is attributed to prevailing policies sending 
mixed signals to potential investors, as the country appears to focus on domestic economic issues rather than 
reforming trade programs (“Latin American Geoeconomics,” 2013).   
 
Brazil is open to foreign investment and affords equal protection for those assets (Mussnich & Peres, 
2013).  In 2005, a new bankruptcy law was enacted (Law 11.101) which allows a firm to remain in operation while 
it reorganizes debt, liquidates its assets, or seeks a private settlement.  Furthermore, the creditors are classified in 
categories per priority (Rosas & Nogueira, 2013). 
 
Paraguay 
 
Paraguay is the smallest member of the MERCOSUR trading bloc and was suspended in 2012 (Desantis, 
2013; Klonsky et al., 2012).  The suspension was based on fellow members deeming the impeachment of the 
nation’s previous president, Mr. Lugo, as unjust.  The impeachment was seen as violating MERCOSUR’s 
democracy clause (Badawy, 2013; Keller, 2012). The nation was offered reinstatement upon the inauguration of a 
newly-elected president, Mr. Cartes.  Paraguay has long objected to Venezuela’s admission to the bloc (Badawy, 
2013; Keller, 2012), so the country has declined reinstatement until the MERCOSUR presidency rotates away from 
Venezuela in July 2014 (“Paraguay's President,” 2013).  Current President Cartes remains hopeful that his country 
will rejoin the bloc as early as 2014 (Badawy, 2013; Desantis, 2013). 
 
Paraguay welcomes foreign investment and provides equal treatment for those assets (Country Conditions: 
Paraguay, 2012, 2013).  The Law 117/91 includes the commercial bankruptcy process and provides “priority for 
claims first to employees, then to the state, and finally to private creditors” (Country Conditions: Paraguay, 2012, p. 
5).  The debtor firm is allowed to reorganize while continuing operations or seeking settlement with debtors or 
liquidation with court approval (Brown, 2013). 
 
Uruguay 
 
MERCOSUR membership is instrumental to Uruguay’s economic development (“Uruguay calls on 
Mercosur”, 2013).  In light of this, the country has encountered trade issues with another bloc member.  Although 
other economic sectors, such as mining, are in development, tourism is an important area for exchange, especially 
with fellow MERCOSUR member, Argentina.  Given Argentina’s recent tax increase governing tourism, the 
relationship with Uruguay has been weakened (“Where is Uruguay’s,” 2013). 
 
Uruguay welcomes outside investment and gives equal treatment for those assets (Country Conditions: 
Uruguay, 2013).  In 2008, the government instituted a new law (Act 18.387) regarding the bankruptcy process.  
Specifically, the Act allows the debtor firm to reorganize while continuing operations, to seek a private settlement 
with debtors or asset liquidation with court approval (Guerrero & Gurmendez, 2013).  Furthermore, the Act limited 
creditors who sought privileged status to those holding secured loans, taxes and labor credits and honoring the entity 
who initiated the action (Beitler, n.d.).  
 
Venezuela 
 
Venezuela joined MERCOSUR as a full member in July 2012.  Its admission has created tension among 
members because its governmental actions indicate an opposition to a free market system (Klonsky et al., 2012; 
Martinez & Iyer, 2013).  Specifically, Venezuela’s economy is dominated with state-controlled policies (Fishlow, 
2013; Hill, 2013; Klonsky et al., 2012; “Latin American Geoeconomics,” 2013; Martinez & Iyer, 2013).  
Furthermore, it is an economy that is dependent on one industry - oil (Haskel, 2013).  The continual government 
interference with economic and political policies may hinder meeting MERCOSUR’s requirements and 2014 
deadline (Keller, 2012).  Furthermore, it is argued that the nation’s inclusion in the bloc was politically, not 
economically, motivated (Haskel, 2013).  
 
Theoretically, foreign investment is allowed in Venezuela; however, recent events indicate otherwise.  
Beginning in 2009, foreign investment began to sharply decline due to the uncertain environment.  This period is 
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marked by increasing government intervention, nationalization, and expropriation impacting many industries 
(Country Conditions: Venezuela, 2013).  Currently, the prevailing bankruptcy laws are considered too antiquated to 
allow judicial-governed reorganization, thereby encouraging private arrangements (Italiani, 2013). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
As competition world-wide increases, cross-border economic pacts will result (Deresky, 2014).  In order 
for a nation to succeed in the globalizing and interdependent marketplace, it must intervene with prudent polices 
(Bisson et al., 2010). For example, it should synchronize its macroeconomic procedures (Canac, 2003; Cordoba, 
2012; Haskel, 2013).  This economic integration and harmonization will create a reliable environment that is 
advantageous for investment (Kleinheisterkamp, 2000; Yong, 2010).  These growing economies require efficient 
institutions by promoting transparency (Tanzi, 2004).  With prudent policy implementation, nations strategically 
attempt to minimize negative impacts from global financial interconnectedness (Agbetsiafa, 2011; Beraho & Elisu, 
2010; Kleinheisterkamp, 2000).  An additional benefit is the creation of a sense of predictability for necessary 
investment and trade growth (Fishlow, 2013; Holt, 2007; Kleinheisterkamp, 2000; Yong, 2010; Gough & 
Venkataramany, 2006). 
  
The net result of globalization is that firms will extend activities and assets across borders (Mohan, 2012).  
Bankruptcy can be an inherent result of the risk involved in business development, and this event is common (Lee et 
al., 2011).  The removal of inefficient firms from the market will serve an economies’ growth by freeing critical 
resources (Stone, 2010).  Although bankruptcy laws differ greatly from one another, they should serve to respond to 
financial issues (Beraho & Elisu, 2010; Lee et al., 2011).  Given the current trend of economic integration and 
desiring growth, developing nations will be required to move toward a unifying framework to provide investors a 
sense of certainty.  The quest for a single unifying framework, such as Universalism, may be in vain, as Holt (2007) 
acknowledges that many nations will resist adhering to such strict tenets.  Given that trade blocs can evolve in an 
inconsistent manner, they still warrant investigation (Castanias & Yelamanchi, 2004). 
 
MERCOSUR 
 
As the South American economies continue to develop, regional-level cooperation is required to foster 
domestic market growth and exporting strength (Gough & Venkataramany, 2006).  The concept of regional 
integration is supported by members sharing geographic and economic commonalities (Castanias & Yelamanchi, 
2004; Cavusgil et al., 2012).  Since the MERCOSUR nations share similar languages and cultures, this commonality 
should serve as an advantage when compared with other trade blocs (Gough & Venkataramany, 2006).  In the early 
years of MERCOSUR, it was economically successful with “trade between the four core members quadrupled” 
(Hill, 2013, p. 303).  As a direct result of the economic interconnectedness, specifically Brazil’s economic downturn 
in 1998 and 1999, the trade bloc was negatively impacted (Hill, 2013; Vigevani & Júnior, 2011).  Along with the 
economic downturn, continued inner disagreements among members halted progress toward achieving a fully 
functioning customs union (Cordoba, 2012; Hill, 2013).  There are mixed assessments of the bloc as some argue that 
MERCOSUR appears to be isolating, rather than opening (Haskel, 2013; Osava, 2013), while others suggest that the 
member nations should seek outside opportunities and engage in other beneficial trade associations (“Uruguay Calls 
on Mercosur,” 2013). 
 
A key component to the bloc’s success is coordination of legislation; unfortunately, the members appear to 
lack unification.  For example, Brazil and Argentina desire higher tariffs, whereas Uruguay and Paraguay prefer 
decreasing the barriers (Keller, 2012).  Canac (2003) and Fishlow (2013) suggest that in the absence of alignment 
within the group, individual nations will pursue their own developmental paths.  Recently, Brazil has grown its 
export relationship with China (de Castro Neves, 2013; Deresky, 2014; Martinez & Iyer, 2013), along with engaging 
with Cuba in medical exchanges (“Latin American Geoeconomics,” 2013).  The heightened trade relationship with 
China may be a possible explanation for Brazil’s lack of consistent movement forward in pursuing greater 
integration with the other MERCOSUR members.  For the bloc, Brazil’s redirection is an unfortunate maneuver 
since it is pivotal in the group’s success (Osava, 2013).    
 
Alignment of foreign policy and adopting growth-enhancing strategies are required for realistic integration; 
unfortunately, individual nations clinging to internalizing tendencies can thwart the alignment (Vigevani & Júnior, 
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2011).  Currently, some members appear committed to their internal policies, not harmonizing the bloc’s legal 
framework (Haskel, 2013).  For example, Venezuela poses several serious issues.  The economy is dominated with 
state-controlled policies exemplifying opposition to a free market system and is highly depended on a single 
industry - oil (Klonsky et al., 2012; Haskel, 2013; “Latin American Geoeconomics,” 2013; Martinez & Iyer, 2013). 
 
Bankruptcy legal structures must harmonize to allow foreign investment and support internal growth of 
developing countries that want to enter the global marketplace (Blodgett & Kane, 2003; Holt, 2007).  The 
MERCOSUR members’ business bankruptcy laws were assessed to determine the bloc’s alignment.  Four of the 
members - Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay - have established modern bankruptcy laws to acknowledge 
and protect foreign investment, allow insolvent firms to reorganize operations, rank creditor claims, and provide for 
private settlements.  The current nationalistic climate in Venezuela does not afford foreign and domestic businesses 
much confidence for investment protection.  Although most members have made progress modernizing their 
bankruptcy procedures, they tend to uphold a Territorial perspective.    
 
Globalization can threaten a nation’s sovereignty, thereby supporting a resistance to consolidating 
economic (Cavusgil et al., 2012) and legal systems (Holt, 2007).  The relinquishment of national sovereignty by 
coordinating legal systems has impeded integration (Cordoba, 2012; Haskel, 2013; Yong, 2010); however, 
harmonization is necessary for economic survival (Blodgett & Kane, 2003).  This inability to reconcile differences 
among the members could ultimately encumber the achievement of a customs union as members implement 
protectionist policies (Cordoba, 2012; de Castro Neves, 2013; Klonsky et al., 2012).   
 
Until recent events, the MERCOSUR members’ activities appeared to shift away from their original 
economic goals and become muddied with political initiatives (Haskel, 2013; Klonsky et al., 2012; “Latin American 
Geoeconomics,” 2013).  This dysfunction is exemplified by MERCOSUR’s inability to proceed with trade talks 
with the EU (Cordoba, 2012; de Castro Neves, August 14, 2013; “Latin American Geoeconomics,” 2013; Latin 
American Integration, 2013).  Recently, Brazil has announced the bloc’s desire to actively negotiate a trade 
agreement with the EU (“Brazil Trade Council Approves,” 2013; Desantis, 2013) which was supported by the 
Uruguayan president (“Mercosur Remains,” 2013).  However, investors and interested parties alike should view 
these statements with caution.  In a rhetorical assessment of MERCOSUR, it is noted that the bloc’s only recent 
unified action was to suspend Paraguay (“Latin American Integration,” 2013).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Firms will seek strategic foreign investment opportunities and developing nations require the infusion of 
foreign capital.  It is critical to assess the country- and regional-level risks, especially the prevailing bankruptcy 
laws.  The trade bloc, MERCOSUR, represents a large economic force in the global marketplace and should not be 
ignored.  Furthermore, its strength will grow as associate members join.  Although there is hope that the bloc will 
move toward acting as a unified entity as it proceeds with trade negotiations with the EU, the current landscape 
should be viewed with caution.  Until recently, the individual members were enacting protectionist policies rather 
than making objective efforts toward legal integration.   
 
This paper argued that moving toward a common set of harmonizing bankruptcy laws would assist to create 
a favorable investor climate, along with encouraging domestic growth.  Since the MERCOSUR members are 
developing nations, it is critical to implement strong policies during positive growth periods; otherwise individual 
members will pursue opportunities elsewhere.  It is acknowledged that the bloc members have made progress toward 
modernizing their business bankruptcy procedures; however, they are not integrated.  Their progress has been halted 
by political and economic conflicting agendas.  By moving beyond these impediments, an alignment among regional 
economies would serve to drive internal and external growth.  It is suggested that the bloc members work toward a 
supranational legal framework that would provide greater transparency, investor confidence, and integration.  This 
alignment will provide a framework for future investigations of other economic trade blocs.     
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